Workplace Investigations in Louisiana: Employee Rights and Privacy

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September 06, 2018
Author: Scott D. Wilson
Organization: Scott D. Wilson, A Professional Law Corporation

I. Bases of Employee Privacy Rights
A. United States Constitution, 4th Amendment:
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965): Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers \"in any house\" in time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the \"right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.\" The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: \"The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.\"

B. La. Const., art. 1, sec. 5:
“Every person shall be secure in his person, property, communications, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy. No warrant shall issue without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, the persons or things to be seized, and the lawful purpose or reason for the search. Any person adversely affected by a search or seizure conducted in violation of this Section shall have standing to raise its illegality in the appropriate court.”

Parish National Bank v. C.E. Lane, 397 So.2d 1281 (La. 1981): “There is some question as to whether the section is intended to protect against private conduct as well as government conduct. The provision seems to be a counterpart to the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. However, Professor Lee Hargrave believes that the section establishes an affirmative right to privacy which goes beyond the domain of criminal law. He notes that the provision was deliberately placed apart from the criminal procedure guarantees. The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35 La.L. Rev. 1 (1974).”

C. Jaubert v. Crowley, 375 So.2d 1386 (La. 1979):
“The right of privacy embraces four different interests, each of which may be invaded in a distinct fashion; Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 95 S.Ct. 1029, 43 L.Ed.2d 328 (1975); Prosser, Law of Torts, 4th ed. (1971); Prosser, Privacy, 48 Calif.L.Rev. 383 (1960); Restatement Second of the Law of Torts (1959). One type of invasion takes the form of the appropriation of an individual's name or likeness, for the use or benefit of the defendant. While it is not necessary that the use or benefit be commercial or pecuniary in nature, the mere fact that a newspaper is published for sale does not constitute such use or benefit on the part of the publisher. Another type of invasion occurs when the defendant unreasonably intrudes upon the plaintiff's physical solitude or seclusion. Because the situation or activity which is intruded upon must be private, an invasion does not occur when an individual makes a photograph of a public sight which any one is free to see; Prosser, Law of Torts, 809. A third type of invasion consists of publicity which unreasonably places the plaintiff in a false light before the public. While the publicity need not be defamatory in nature, but only objectionable to a reasonable person under the circumstances, it must contain either falsity or fiction. A fourth type of invasion is represented by unreasonable public disclosure of embarrassing private facts. With reference to this category, Prosser states that \"[i]t seems to be generally agreed that anything visible in a public place can be recorded and given circulation by means of a photograph, to the same extent as by a written description, since this amounts to nothing more than giving publicity to what is already public and what anyone present would be free to see.\" Law of Torts, 811. Similarly, the Restatement Second of the Law of Torts indicates that \"there is no liability for giving further publicity to what the plaintiff himself leaves open to the public eye.\" Supra at 386.

“In Louisiana jurisprudence, the right to privacy has been variously defined as \"the right to be let alone\" and \"the right to an `inviolate personality.'\" Pack v. Wise, 155 So.2d 909, 913 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1963), quoting Hamilton v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 82 So.2d 61, 63 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1955), writ denied 1955. Where an individual has such a right, in the form of one of the interests outlined above, other members of society have a corresponding duty not to violate that right. A violation constitutes a breach of duty, or fault, and may be actionable under C.C. 2315, which provides that \"[e]very act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it.\" Pack v. Wise, supra; Tuyes v. Chambers, 144 La. 723, 81 So. 265 (1919). Where no such right to privacy exists, however, a person's conduct may be the cause of another person's embarrassment, discomfiture, or monetary loss, but it will not constitute a \"legal cause,\" because no duty has been breached.

“Even where a right to privacy is found to exist, Louisiana courts have distinguished between invasions of that right which are actionable and those which are not. An actionable invasion of privacy occurs only when the defendant's conduct is unreasonable4 and seriously interferes with the plaintiff's privacy interest. Comment, The Right of Privacy in Louisiana, 28 La.L. Rev. 469 (1968). For an invasion to be actionable, it is not necessary that there be malicious intent on the part of the defendant. Lucas v. Ludwig, 313 So.2d 12 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975), writ denied 1975. The reasonableness of the defendant's conduct is determined by balancing the conflicting interests at stake; the plaintiff's interest in protecting his privacy from serious invasions, and the defendant's interest in pursuing his course of conduct. Thus, it was found reasonable for a school board, during the war effort, to inquire into teachers' use of their afterschool time, Reed v. Orleans Parish School Board, 21 So.2d 895 (La.App. Orl. Cir. 1945), and for a school board to require that its employees undergo medical examinations and that the results be disclosed to school officers. Pitcher v. Iberia Parish School Board, 280 So.2d 603 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1973), writ denied 1973, cert. denied 416 U.S. 904, 94 S.Ct. 1608, 40 L.Ed.2d 109 (1974). On the other hand, it was held unreasonable for a private employer to utilize medical photographs of an employee's work-related injury, in its safety campaign, without obtaining the employee's consent or withholding his name. Lambert v. Dow Chemical Co., 215 So.2d 673 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1968).

D. La. R.S. 51:3071, et seq.
\"Database Security Breach Notification Law\"
§3074. Disclosure upon breach in the security of personal information; notification requirements; exemption

A. Any person that conducts business in the state or that owns or licenses computerized data that includes personal information, or any agency that owns or licenses computerized data that includes personal information, shall, following discovery of a breach in the security of the system containing such data, notify any resident of the state whose personal information was, or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized person.

B. Any agency or person that maintains computerized data that includes personal information that the agency or person does not own shall notify the owner or licensee of the information if the personal information was, or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized person through a breach of security of the system containing such data, following discovery by the agency or person of a breach of security of the system.

C. The notification required pursuant to Subsections A and B of this Section shall be made in the most expedient time possible and without unreasonable delay, consistent with the legitimate needs of law enforcement, as provided in Subsection D of this Section, or any measures necessary to determine the scope of the breach, prevent further disclosures, and restore the reasonable integrity of the data system.

D. If a law enforcement agency determines that the notification required under this Section would impede a criminal investigation, such notification may be delayed until such law enforcement agency determines that the notification will no longer compromise such investigation.

E. Notification may be provided by one of the following methods:
(1) Written notification.
(2) Electronic notification, if the notification provided is consistent with the provisions regarding electronic records and signatures set forth in 15 USC 7001.
(3) Substitute notification, if an agency or person demonstrates that the cost of providing notification would exceed two hundred fifty thousand dollars, or that the affected class of persons to be notified exceeds five hundred thousand, or the agency or person does not have sufficient contact information. Substitute notification shall consist of all of the following:
(a) E-mail notification when the agency or person has an e-mail address for the subject persons.
(b) Conspicuous posting of the notification on the Internet site of the agency or person, if an Internet site is maintained.
(c) Notification to major statewide media.

F. Notwithstanding Subsection E of this Section, an agency or person that maintains a notification procedure as part of its information security policy for the treatment of personal information which is otherwise consistent with the timing requirements of this Section shall be deemed to be in compliance with the notification requirements of this Section if the agency or person notifies subject persons in accordance with the policy and procedure in the event of a breach of security of the system.

G. Notification under this section is not required if after a reasonable investigation the person or business determines that there is no reasonable likelihood of harm to customers. §3075.

Recovery of damages
A civil action may be instituted to recover actual damages resulting from the failure to disclose in a timely manner to a person that there has been a breach of the security system resulting in the disclosure of a person's personal information.

E. Ponder v. Pfizer, 522 F.Supp.2d 793 (2007)
Sometime before June 2007, private data on approximately 17,000 former and current Pfizer employees left the confines of a Pfizer hard drive and ventured into an unauthorized domain. The data were stored on a Pfizer laptop computer which the company provided to one of its employees for home use. Due to the installation of unauthorized file-sharing software on the laptop, files stored in, the laptop containing data on the names, social security numbers, and in some instances, addresses and bonus information of Pfizer employees became exposed to outsiders. According to Pfizer, an investigation revealed \"that certain files containing [employee] data were accessed and copied.\"

On June 1, 2007, the Pfizer Privacy Office notified affected employees, including Terry Horne, via written letter, of the breach. The letter, signed by Lisa M. Golden, a Pfizer Vice President, included details of the incident and the steps Pfizer had taken to protect the privacy and security of its employees in the wake of the breach. According to the letter, Pfizer had no indication that any unauthorized individual had used personal information contained in the data.

In the wake of the disclosure, Pfizer's letter advised employees to remain vigilant against the possibility of fraud and/or identity theft by monitoring account statements and credit reports for unusual activity In his complaint, Mr. Horne alleges the following damages pursuant to La. R.S. 51:3075: \"fear and apprehension of fraud, loss of money, and identity theft; the burden and cost of credit monitoring; the burden and cost of closing compromised credit accounts and opening new accounts; the burden of scrutinizing credit card statements and other statements for unauthorized transactions; damage to [] credit; loss of privacy; and other economic damages.\" (Doc. 21 ¶ 22). Home claims that these damages are not speculative future damages; that currently he has the burden and cost of credit monitoring, of closing compromised accounts and opening new accounts of scrutinizing credit card statements, and loss of privacy. Horne argues that these damages will continue indefinitely. However, Mr. Horne's complaint does not allege that his social security number or other private information was actually used by an unauthorized person, it does not allege that money has been taken unlawfully from any of his accounts, or that his credit card was used by anyone not authorized or that anyone has opened a credit card or other account in his name. It merely alleges that he has the burden of monitoring and bearing the cost if his exposed personal information is used in an illicit manner by an unauthorized individual. Horne argues that he and the other plaintiffs do not merely fear that their information has been disclosed, because there is no question that it has been exposed. He argues that he and the other plaintiffs have the current burden of monitoring their credit, scrutinizing account statements, and closing and opening accounts. This Court, however, finds that Mr. Horne's complaint does not allege that he suffered any actual damages — that someone actually used the disclosed information to his detriment.

Resolving the question left open in the footnote in the Parish National Bank case: \"The Louisiana Constitution's protection of privacy provisions contained in Article 1, § 5 does not extend so far as to protect private citizens against the actions of private parties.\" It should be noted that there are two possible inquiries a court can undertake to determine when the injury accrues. The first suggests that the injury accrues when the data are exposed, and becomes obtained by a third party. The other, more persuasive inquiry, and the one adopted by the Seventh Circuit in Pisciotta — and this Court today — finds that the injury accrues when the compromised data are actually used by a third party to steal someone's identity.

E. The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 USC 552a
The Privacy Act of 1974 was created in response to concerns about how the creation and use of computerized databases might impact individuals' privacy rights. It safeguards privacy through creating four procedural and substantive rights in personal data. First, it requires government agencies to show an individual any records kept on him or her. Second, it requires agencies to follow certain principles, called \"fair information practices,\" when gathering and handling personal data. Third, it places restrictions on how agencies can share an individual's data with other people and agencies. Fourth and finally, it lets individuals sue the government for violating its provisions.

There are, however, several exceptions to the Privacy Act. For one thing, government agencies that are engaged in law enforcement can excuse themselves from the Act's rules. Agencies have also circumvented information sharing rules by exploiting a \"routine use\" exemption.

One of the twelve reasons that an agency might be allowed to disclose personal information is if the disclosure is \"for a routine use as defined in subsection (a)(7) of this section and described under subsection (e)(4)(D) of this section.\"

Subsection (a)(7) simply defines \"routine use\" as \"the use of such record for a purpose which is compatible with the purpose for which it was collected.\" Note that a routine use does not have to be a purpose identical to the purpose for which the record was collected, only a compatible purpose. This phrasing can often lead to \"mission creep\" for a system of records, in which the routine uses for a particular database gradually increase until its scope is far greater than its originally stated goals.

Subsection (e)(4)(D) simply requires that the routine uses be stated in the Federal Register. While this might suggest that all potential routine uses must be listed, the reality is that these listings are often so broad as to include all potential uses of the data.

II. Monitoring of Email, Voicemail, Telephones; Video Surveillance
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1988, 18 USC 2510, et seq., forbids surreptitious and intentional interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications. Violation of the Act can result in criminal sanctions as well as a private action giving rise to equitable or declaratory relief, actual and punitive damages, as well as attorney’s fees and other litigation costs. Louisiana’s Electronic Surveillance Act is found at La. R.S. 15:1301, and its criminal statute prohibiting wire tapping is found at La. R.S. 14:322.

The federal wiretapping act contains an exception where the interception is over a telephone extension used by the employer in the ordinary course of business. 18 USC 2510(5)(a)(I). Employers should inform employees in writing that their calls may be monitored. And, once it is determined that an employee is on a personal call, the monitoring should end at once.

In Briggs v. American Air Filter Co., 630 F.2d 414 (5 Cir. 1980), a supervisor used an extension phone to listen to and record a telephone conversation between a current employee and a former employee who was now a competitor and a friend of the current employee of American. American’s employee had been suspected of disclosing confidential information to the competitor and had been specifically warned against divulging such information. The court held it was within the ordinary course of business to listen in for at least as long as the call involved the type of information the employer feared was being disclosed. Thus, the exemption applied and no consent was needed to intercept the telephone conversation.

The Electronic Communications Privacy Act was an amendment to Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (the Wiretap Statute), which was primarily designed to prevent unauthorized government access to private electronic communications. The ECPA has been amended by the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) of 1994, the USA PATRIOT Act (2001), the USA PATRIOT reauthorization acts (2006), and the FISA Amendments Act (2008). The ECPA extended government restrictions on wire taps from telephone calls to include transmissions of electronic data by computer (18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq.), added new provisions prohibiting access to stored electronic communications, i.e., the Stored Communications Act (18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq.), and added so-called pen/trap provisions that permit the tracing of telephone communications (18 U.S.C. § 3121 et seq.).

In Robbins v. Lower Merion School District (2010), also known as \"WebcamGate\", the plaintiffs charged that two suburban Philadelphia high schools violated ECPA by remotely activating the webcams embedded in school-issued laptops and monitoring the students at home. The schools admitted to secretly snapping over 66,000 webshots and screenshots, including webcam shots of students in their bedrooms. The school district agreed to pay $610,000 to settle the Robbins and parallel Hasan lawsuits against it.

Employers are generally free to read employee email messages, as long as there is a valid business purpose for doing so. Many companies adopt email policies telling employees that their email is not private and that the company is monitoring email messages. Some companies require employees to sign a form acknowledging the email policy. Even without a signed acknowledgment and written policy, though, an employer still probably has the legal right to read employee email messages sent using its equipment and network. Some email systems automatically copy all messages that pass through them, and some create backup copies. Some employers use ‘keylogger” software that might even have copies of draft email messages that were never sent. An employer may conduct conventional surveillance or observation of an employee’s residence from a public street, since it does not implicate a constitutionally protected or reasonable expectation of privacy. Claverie v. LSU Medical Center, 553 So.2d 482 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1989); also Fayard v. Guardsmark, Inc., 5 I.E.R. Cases (E.D.La. 1989). Meche v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 692 So.2d 544 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1997), involved consolidated cases that arose ut of a security employee who attempted to place a closed circuit television camera in the ceiling of a unisex employee restroom, believing that a member of the night crew was stealing merchandise. An employee discovered the equipment before it was connected and sued for invasion of privacy and violation of the ECPA. The court stated there was only an attempted invasion of privacy since the equipment was never set up, and ruled that the ECPA was not implicated since the plaintiff never engaged in any protected communication nor was any such intercepted.

III. Searches
A. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987), is a United States Supreme
Court decision on the Fourth Amendment rights of government employees with regard to administrative searches in the workplace, during investigations by “supervisors,” as distinguished by law enforcement, for violations of employee policy rather than by law enforcement for criminal offenses. The Court held that under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, a public employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy as to his desk and files in his private office, but that no warrant or “probable cause” was required for his supervisors to search them for non-investigatory work-related purposes (as office inventory), or for investigation of work-related misconduct, which the Court defined as “inefficiency, incompetence, mismanagement, or other work-related misfeasance of employees.”

The keys to the analysis in O’Connor allowing the search under the “reasonableness under all circumstances” rather than “probable cause” standard were that the investigation was performed by a “supervisor” rather than by “law enforcement,” and that it was an “administrative search” either for non-investigatory work-related purposes or for investigation of “inefficiency, incompetence, mismanagement, or other work related misfeasance of employees.”

The Fifth Circuit extended this analysis in its unpublished opinion in Timmerman v. McLaughlin, 97-30300, (8/28/97), 125 F.3d 852. Dr. Timmerman was an LSU professor. LSU officials had received a tip by telephone from an informant that Dr. Timmerman intended to harm himself and others with a firearm. LSU officials forced Dr. Timmerman to undergo psychiatric evaluation, which he passed. They also employed LSU police officers to search his office for a weapon and found none. Dr. Timmerman sued for invasion of privacy, among other things, alleging that the search of his office for a weapon by LSU police officers should have been with a warrant and under the probable cause standard rather than the O’Connor “reasonableness under all the circumstances” standard. The court disagreed and stated the search was for evidence of work-related misconduct, and that although LSU police officers conducted the search, they did so at the request of LSU administrators. It is difficult to imagine what is left of the “probable cause” standard. This search was not to retrieve a file nor for investigation of inefficiency, incompetence, or mismanagement. And the Fifth Circuit sought support from O’Connor where a “hospital security officer” had participated in the challenged  search, despite this language from the O’Connor court:

Individuals do not lose Fourth Amendment rights merely because they
work for the government, instead of a private employer. The operational
realities of the workplace, however, may make some employees'
expectations of privacy unreasonable when an intrusion is by a supervisor,
rather than a law enforcement official....

While police, and even administrative enforcement personnel, conduct
searches for the primary purpose of obtaining evidence for use in criminal
or other enforcement proceedings, employers most frequently need to
enter the offices and desks of their employees for legitimate work-related
reasons wholly unrelated to illegal conduct....

Imposing unwieldy warrant procedures in such cases upon supervisors,
who would otherwise have no reason to be familiar with such procedures,
is simply unreasonable. In contrast to other circumstances in which we
have required warrants, supervisors in offices such as at the Hospital are
hardly in the business of investigating the violation of criminal laws....
Additionally, while law enforcement officials are expected to \"schoo[l]
themselves in the niceties of probable cause,\" id. at 469 U. S. 343, no such
expectation is generally applicable to public employers, at least when the
search is not used to gather evidence of a criminal offense. It is simply
unrealistic to expect supervisors in most government agencies to learn the
subtleties of the probable cause standard. As JUSTICE BLACKMUN
observed in T.L.O., \"[a] teacher has neither the training nor the day-to-day
experience in the complexities of probable cause that a law enforcement
officer possesses, and is ill-equipped to make a quick judgment about the
existence of probable cause.\"

107 S.Ct. at 1497, 1499-1500, 1501.

Personnel Files and Medical Records

La. R.S. 23:1125: Right of employee to written report of medical examination; penalty for failure to furnish

A. Whenever an employee who is being treated by his choice of medical provider shall, at the request of the employer, the employer's insurer, or the representative of the employer or its insurer, submit to any type of medical examination and a medical report is received by said requester, such employee or his representative shall be entitled to a copy of the written report of the results of said examination within thirty days from the date the requester receives the report.

B. Whenever an employee has accepted medical treatment by a health care provider referred by the employer, the employer's insurer, or the representative of the employer or its insurer, he shall be entitled to receive a copy of any medical records of the medical provider that are in the possession of the employer or its insurer within thirty days from the date of the written demand upon the employer, the employer's insurer, or the representative of the employer or its insurer.

C. Such written report or records shall be furnished to said employee or his representative at no cost to the employee. Any employer who without just cause fails to furnish such report or records to an employee so requesting same within the thirty-day period provided for above shall be liable to the employee for a civil penalty in the amount of two hundred fifty dollars, plus reasonable attorney fees for the collection of such penalty.

La. R.S. 49:1012: Employee drug testing; responsibility of employer
A. All information, interviews, reports, statements, memoranda, or test results received by the employer through its drug testing program are confidential communications and may not be used or received in evidence, obtained in discovery, or disclosed in any public or private proceedings, except in an administrative or disciplinary proceeding or hearing, or civil litigation where drug use by the tested individual is relevant.

B. No cause of action for defamation of character, libel, slander, or damage to reputation or privacy arises in favor of any person against an employer or testing entity who has established a program of drug or alcohol testing in accordance with this Chapter, unless:
(1) The results of that test were disclosed to any person other than the employer or testing entity, an authorized employee or agent of the employer or testing entity, the tested employee, or the tested prospective employee;
(2) The information disclosed was based on a false test result or a failure to comply with the provisions of this Chapter;
(3) All elements of an action for defamation of character, libel, slander, or damage to reputation or privacy as established by statute or civil law, are satisfied.

C. Any provision of this Chapter held to be prohibited by the laws of the state of Louisiana shall be ineffective to the extent of such prohibition without invalidating the remaining provisions of this Chapter.

La. R.S. 23:1127, Workers Compensation records (in pertinent part)
§1127. Release of medical records and information
A. It is the policy for the efficient administration of the workers' compensation system that there be reasonable access to medical information for all parties to coordinate and manage the care for the injured worker and to facilitate his return to work.

B.(1) In any claim for compensation, a health care provider who has at any time treated the employee related to the compensation claim shall release any requested medical information and records relative to the employee's injury, to any of the following persons:
(a) The employee, his agent, or his representative.
(b) A licensed and approved vocational rehabilitation counselor assigned to the employee's claim.
(c) Another health care provider examining the employee.
(d) The employer, his agent, or his representative.
(e) The employer's workers' compensation insurer or its agent or representative.
(2) Any information relative to any other treatment or condition shall be available to the employer or his workers' compensation insurer by subpoena or through a written release by the claimant.

17:1237 School employees, Access to files
A. No school employee shall be denied access to his personnel file. The contents of a school employee's personnel file shall not be divulged to third parties absent the express written consent of the school employee, except when ordered by a court or by subpoena, and no school system employee other than the personnel file custodian or the superintendent of schools for the system, or the designee of either who shall be a school system employee shall be allowed access to a school employee's personnel file without the school employee's express written consent, unless that employee is charged with the duty of supervising that particular school employee's performance. In the case that a personnel file should be accessed by the superintendent or someone designated by him, the employee whose file was so accessed shall receive written notice of the fact and the name and title of the person who was permitted access. All persons permitted access under this Section shall maintain the confidentiality of those documents in the file which are not matters of public record.

B. Any school employee requesting to see his personnel file shall be given access to his entire personnel file, including but not limited to all documents placed in the employee's file on or before September 1, 1987, except for any portion of the file maintained at his specific work site, at a single location, and within a reasonable time after making the request. Such an employee shall be given access to any portion of his personnel file maintained at his work site, including but not limited to all documents placed in the employee's file on or before September 1, 1987, at such site and at any reasonable time.

17:3884, school employees; evaluation and response– key provision: Each evaluation required in this Part shall be documented in writing and a copy shall be transmitted to the school employee not later than fifteen days after the evaluation takes place. The employee shall have the right to initiate a written reaction or response to the evaluation. Such response and evaluation shall become a permanent attachment to the official personnel file for the employee.

La. R.S. 23:7 Access to books, accounts, records, etc.
The executive director [of the Louisiana Workforce Commission] or any duly authorized representative of the commission shall, for the purpose of examination, have access to and the right to copy any book, account, record, payroll, paper, or document relating to the employment of workers.

La. R.S. 23:14 Employers to furnish information; keeping of records
A. Every employer shall furnish to the commission all information which the executive director or his representative may require. Every employer shall make true and specific answers to all questions submitted by the commission, orally or in writing, as required by the commission.

B. Every employer shall keep a true and accurate record of the name, address, and occupation of each person employed by him, of the daily and weekly hours worked by, and of the wages paid each pay period to each employee. These records shall be kept on file for at least one year after the date of the record.

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